Governments Accelerate Post-Quantum Cryptography Shift as Deadlines Loom

Quantum computers could eventually break widely used public-key encryption, pushing companies to prepare for post-quantum cryptography, or PQC. Cybersecurity provider F5 said the transition must extend beyond replacing TLS certificates. Organizations also need visibility into algorithms, keys, protocols and other cryptographic components embedded across applications, infrastructure and supply chains, where overlooked legacy technology could create security gaps.

F5 recommended that companies begin with a comprehensive inventory and adopt a machine-readable Cryptographic Bill of Materials, or CBOM, to document where cryptographic assets reside, how they are used and what systems depend on them. Because no single discovery method can cover every environment, businesses should combine network traffic analysis, source-code scanning and configuration reviews to reduce blind spots, assess exposure and prioritize upgrades according to risk and operational importance.

The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized its first post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, accelerating plans to replace RSA and elliptic-curve systems that could eventually be broken by quantum computers. The transition is not a simple software swap: PQC public keys and signatures are often far larger than their classical counterparts. Once protected traffic exceeds the common 1,500-byte Ethernet maximum transmission unit, cryptographic migration begins to affect packet handling, transport protocols and network architecture.

Recent deployment work has highlighted the operational risk. Adding PQC signatures to TLS handshakes or VPN traffic can push a single message beyond the 1,500-byte threshold, triggering IPv4 fragmentation or requiring endpoints to resize packets under IPv6. Some firewalls and middleboxes may treat a surge in fragmented traffic as a denial-of-service attack and discard it. Network operators must therefore reassess path-MTU discovery, maximum segment size settings, certificate-chain size and device compatibility before broad deployment.

Quantum computers could eventually break widely used public-key cryptography, creating an unusually long planning horizon for semiconductor makers. Chips deployed in vehicles, industrial systems and other infrastructure can remain in service for 10 to 20 years, meaning hardware designed today may still be operating when quantum attacks become practical. The industry is therefore moving post-quantum cryptography, or PQC, into the design phase.

The latest push is turning PQC migration into a contest over chip architecture and power, performance and area, known as PPA. Global semiconductor groups and Taiwanese IC designers are reworking cryptographic accelerators and open-source roots of trust to handle more complex algorithms efficiently. The central challenge is to add durable quantum-resistant protection without sharply increasing silicon area, energy use or cost over products’ extended operating lives.